RECEIVED
JUN 25 1976
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

_____Term, 1976

No. 75-6981

****

JAMES A. BUSH,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Respondent,

****

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

****

GRADY MERCER, JR.
Post Office Box 386
Jacksonville, North Carolina
Telephone: (919) 346-4166
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

INDEX

	Page
Citation to Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Question Presented	2
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved	3-4
Statement of the Case	4-9
How the Federal Question was Raised and Decided Below	10
Reasons for Granting the Writ	
This Court should Grant Certiorari To Consider Whether the Imposition and Carrying out of the Sentence of Death for the Crime of Murder Under the Law of North Carolina violates the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States	11
Conclusion	12
Appendix A, State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159	1a

TABLE OF CASES

Fowler v. North Carolina, No. 73-7031 (Certiorari granted October 29, 1974)	11
Henderson v. North Carolina, No. 73-5853 (June 8, 1974)	11
Woodson and Waxton v. North Carolina, No. 75- (, 1975)	11
State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159	1, 10
State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973)	11
Statutes:	
N.C. Sess. Laws 1973 (2nd Sess., 1974) c. 1201, § 1, amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1974 cum. Supp.)	2
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87 (repl. Vol. 1969)	2
§ 15-176.3 (repl. Vol. 1975)	2
§ 15-176.4 (repl. Vol. 1975)	3
§ 15-176.5 (repl. Vol. 1975)	3
§ 15-187 (repl. Vol. 1975)	3
§ 15-188 (repl. Vol. 1975)	3
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (3)	1

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

_____Term, 1976

No, 76- _____

****

JAMES A. BUSH,

Petitioner,

-v.-

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,

Respondent,

****

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

The Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme court of the State of North Carolina entered on January 29, 1976.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is reported at 289 N.C. 159.

JURISDICTION

The Judgement of the Supreme Court of North Carolina was entered and filed on January 29, 1976, and is set out in Appendix A hereto. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 NC § 1257 (3), Petitioner having asserted below, and is asserting here, deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States.

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death for the crime of murder under the laws of North Carolina violates the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. This case involves the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

2. This case also involves the following provisions of the General Statutes of North Carolina:

N.C. Sess. Laws 1973 (2nd Sess., 1974), c. 1201, §1, amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1974 cum. supp.):

> "Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.-- A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the prepetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison."

§14-87 (repl. vol. 1969):

> "Robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons.-- Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place of business, residence, or banking institution or any other place where there is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, either day or night, or who aids or abets any such person or persons in the commission of such crime, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than thirty years."

§15-176.3 (repl. vol. 1975):

> "Informing and questioning potential jurors on consequences of guilty verdict.--When a jury is being selected for a case in which the defendant is indicted for a crime for which the penalty is a sentence of death, the court, the defense, or the State may inform any person called to serve as a potential juror that the death penalty will be imposed

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

upon the return of a verdict of guilty of that crime and may inquire of any person called to serve as a potential juror whether that person understands the consequences of a verdict of guilty of that crime."

§ 15-176.4 (repl. vol. 1975):

"Instruction to jury on consequences of guilty verdict.--When a defendant is indicted for a crime for which the penalty is a sentence of death, the court, upon request by either party, shall instruct the jury that the death penalty will be imposed upon the return of a verdict of guilty of that crime."

§15-176.5 (repl. vol. 1975):

"Argument to jury on consequences of guilty verdict.-- When a case will be submitted to a jury on a charge for which the penalty is a sentence of death, either party in its argument to the jury may indicate the consequences of a verdict of guilty of that charge."

§15-187 (repl. vol. 1975):

"Death by administration of lethal gas.-- Death by electrocution under sentence of law is hereby abolished and death by the administration of lethal gas substituted therefor."

§15-188 (repl. vol. 1975):

"Manner and place of execution.-- The mode of executing a death sentence must in every case be by causing the convict or felon to inhale lethal gas of sufficient quantity to cause death, and the administration of such lethal gas must be continued until such convict or felon is dead; and when any person, convict or felon shall be sentenced by any court of the State having competent jurisdiction to be so executed, such punishment shall only be inflicted within a permanent death chamber which the superintendent of the State penitentiary is hereby authorized and directed to provide within the walls of the North Carolina pentitentiary at Raleigh, North Carolina. The superintendent of the State penitentiary shall also cause to be provided, in conformity with this article and approved by the Governor and Council of State, the necessary appliances for the infliction of the punishment of death in accordance with the requirements of this article."

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 18, 1974, Eva Ann Marshburn and her husband, Kirby Marshburn, lived about eleven miles from Jacksonville, North Carolina on Highway 258 and Mrs. Marshburn was working at Belk's Department Store in Jacksonville and Kirby Marshburn was working at Simpson Brothers Store on Highway 258. On November 18, Mr. Marshburn left home about 6:00 a.m. to go to work and Mrs. Marshburn left at about 1:00 p.m. to go to work. When Mrs. Marshburn returned at about 7:40 p.m. she was driving a 1970 Ford. Her husband's truck was parked in front of the mobile home. Upon entering the mobile home Mrs. Marshburn noticed the bedrooms were disarrayed and in the living - dining area she saw her husband lying on the floor in some blood. There was a steak knife and a billfold lying near the body of her husband andupon getting up the defendant was standing behind her. A conversation took place between the defendant and Mrs. Marshburn and Mrs. Marshburn asked that the defendant not kill her and the defendant stated that he would not. The defendant tied Mrs. Marshburn in a chair in the dining area after he took about $3 and some change from her. The defendant cut the telephone wires and got Mrs. Marshburn's car keys and left. The defendant came back in a few minutes later and asked how to turn on the lights in the car. He also asked if there was a gun in the house and Mrs. Marshburn told him where a rifle was and he got it and there were no shells. The defendant left and some time later Mrs. Marshburn got free of the chair and went for help.

Mrs. Marshburn did not know if her husband was carrying a wallet on that occasion or if he had any money in his pocket but it was his normal custom to carry a wallet and he "usually" had some money in his pocket. The defendant did not physically harm Mrs. Marshburn (Rpn.10-17).

Members of the Onslow County Sheriff's Department arrived at about 10:18 p.m. and the Medical Examiner arrived shortly thereafter. Mr. Marshburn had been cut on the neck and there were several stab wounds in the front of his body. (R.p. 17).

Sometime after 9:00 p.m. on November 18, 1974, Michael James Papenfuse left a club on Highway 258 between the Marshburn home and Jacksonville and outside the club he saw a man that he knows to be the defendant. The two men chatted; the defendant went inside for a short time and then left. A Deputy Sheriff found the Marshburn automobile at

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

about 11:30 p.m. on November 10, 1974, near the main entrance gate to Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base near Jacksonville. (R.pp. 19-20).

Earlier on the night of November 10, 1974, the defendant had been at an enlisted men's club at Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base. He had arrived at about 4:30 p.m. and had stayed until about 6:00 p.m. and had been drinking beer. On one or two occasions he had been asked to get from behind the bar by the manager. On one occasion he had been behind the bar playing with children of the barmaid that were behind the bar with her. The keys to the barmaid's car (1974 Pontiac) disappeared and the defendant left the premises at about 6:00 p.m. The 1974 Pontiac was later found in a ditch about one mile from the Marshburn home town is Richlands. (R.pp. 19-20).

The County Medical Examiner examined the Marshburn body at about 11:00 p.m. in the Marshburn home and performed an autopsy at :15 a.m. the next day. There were six stab wounds in the front of the body and several lacerations on the face and a cut on the neck. In the opinion of the Medical Examiner death was caused by a stab wound through the sternum into the heart. The only wound that would have caused death was the wound in the heart. The sternum is a moderately hard and thin bone in the middle of the chest and it could be pierced by a pencil or any other sharp object. (R.pp. 21-22).

On the night of November 10, 1974, prior to :15 p.m. two persons stopped at a black 1974 Pontiac that was in a ditch about one mile from the Marshburn home and the defendant was with the car. Each person offered assistance but the defendant stated that he would try to get a ride back to the Marine Corps Base because he was wearing a utility uniform and this was not proper dress in off-base areas. There was no difficulty between the defendant and either person who stopped. If one were to leave the place where the Pontiac was in the ditch and go toward Jacksonville, the Kirby Marshburn mobile home would be the first residence on the way. There was a house right across the road from the car and it did not appear that anyone was home by looking at the home although someone was actually in the house. The 1974 Pontiac was the car that was owned by the husband of the barmaid at the club where James Bush had been earlier that evening. The Ford automobile that was found near the main entrance gate to Camp Lejeune was the car that was owned by Mrs. Marshburn. (R.pp. 23-25).

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

A Detective with the Onslow County Sheriff's Department testified that he interviewed the defendant on November 1[illegible], 1974, and after advising the defendant of his constitutional rights the defendant told him that he had taken the Pontiac from the club, had been drunk and had run the car into a ditch and had walked up the road to the first home and knocked on the door and asked to use the phone. He further stated that he was allowed into the home by a man that he now knows to have been Mr. Marshburn, that he tried to use the phone but could not reach his party and that he then asked Mr. Marshburn for a drink of water which he was given. He stated that the man got belligerent with him and told him to get out of the house and pushed him into the sink and that he (the defendant) grabbed a knife out of the sink and stabbed the man two or three times. That he (the defendant) was in the truck outside the home when Mrs. Marshburn came home and that he went inside after her and took $3 from her and tied her up. He stated that he told the woman that he was not going to kill her and he did not mean to kill her husband. He stated that he could not find the light switch on the woman's car and went inside and asked her about a gun and she gave him a rifle. The defendant stated that he went to the base, left the car at the gate and walked onto base and took a taxi to his barracks where he went to bed but could not go to sleep because he was thinking about what had happened. At his barracks the defendant showed the officers where he had put the car keys, the clothes that he had worn and let the officer get into his locker without a search warrant. The defendant told the officer about meeting Mr. Papenfuse. (R.po. 25-29).

Detective Bill Woodward talked to the defendant and the defendant showed him his clothing and recited to him what he stated happened in the mobile home. The defendant showed Mr. Woodward where he had placed the keys to the Pontiac automobile and showed him the wooded area where he had thrown the keys to the Ford. The defendant told Officer Woodward all of this after he had been advised of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. On the night in question Mr. Woodward stated that the area around the Marshburn residence was wet and the weather was cool. (R.pp. 29-31).

The clothing that the defendant had worn that night was taken by Deputy Arthur A. Marshburn and turned over to SBI Agent Phillips who in

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

turn turned it over to an SBI laboratory chemist. The chemist found traces of human blood on some of the clothes but not on other pieces of clothing. On the defendant's trousers he found two spots of blood on the left trouser leg in the area near the inseam. On the right leg he also found blood on the inside of the leg. He found a substance on the kitchen knife that proved to be human blood and also found human blood on the defendant's boots. On the defendant's gloves there was a substance that appeared to be grease and dirt. All the blood that was human blood was of Group A, the same group of the deceased's blood. (R.pp. 31-35).

The defendant testified and stated that he was twenty years of age and was from Albany, New York and that he was a military truck driver at Camp Lejeune. That on November 18, 1974, he worked until 4:30 and went to the service club to drink beer and play pool. He was wearing the gloves that he word ar work and they had dirt and grease on them. That he stayed at the club until 7:15 p.m., that he did not go behind the counter and was not asked to leave. That he took the Pontiac automobile without permission and was drunk and drove the car in a ditch. That one or more young men stopped to help him and he later left walking towards Jacksonville and came to a mobile home with a truck out front and knocked on the door and was allowed into the mobile home to use the phone. That he tried to make a phone call but could not reach the party he was seeking and asked for a drink of water and this was given to him by the man. That up until that time the relationship had been good. That as he was drinking the water he stood by the sink and the man started talking about a "colored boy" down the road who owned a wrecker. As a result of this, ill words followed and the man pushed the defendant against the sink and told him to get out of the mobile home and the defendant grabbed a knife out of the sink and stabbed the man several times in the chest and the man fell. That at this time the defendant had had no evil purpose in mind and did not go to the mobile home to rob anybody. That after stabbing the man he looked for the car keys and that is the way the bedrooms became disarrayed. That he went through the man's pockets and found car keys and looked in the man's wallet and threw the wallet on the floor. That prior to stabbing the man he had no idea or intention of going through the house or looking at the man's wallet. That while he was outside a lady drove up and went

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

into the house and he followed he / That inside he had a confrontation with the lady and told her he did not want to kill her and he said nothing to her as to why he stabbed the man. He only told her he did not want to kill her and he had not meant to kill her husband. That he tied the lady up with drapery cords in a chair, took $3 from her and left but came back because he couldn't find the lights on the car. He got a rifle and it was not loaded and he never pointed it at the lady. That he left the house and drove off in the Ford automobile. That he stopped at a club between the Marshburn house and Jacksonville to get some cigarettes and saw a man named Papenfuse. That he did not leave the house in the truck when the lady came up because he did not want to be followed. That he cut the telephone cord to make sure the lady did not call the police and that he did not tie the lady tight because he did not want to hurt her. That when he made his statement to the officers he realized he did not have to make the statement and when he gave him permission to search his locker he realized that he did not have to. He stabbed the man to get him away from him although he now realizes he probably used more force than was necessary. That in New York he had been convicted of assault, car theft and possession of Marijuana in North Carolina. That he joined the Marine Corps because of the car theft charges. That the people that had offered him assistence were refused by him because he had to get all the way back to base because of his dress. That he did not know the man that he stabbed; that he did not know if anyone else was in the house although he had not seen anybody else and that he only stabbed the man after he had been pushed back against the sink. That the man was much older than him although he did not know that the man was sixty-five years old. That he agreed that it was strange that the man would tell him to get out and then push him away from the direction of the door. That while walking from the Pontiac to the Marshburn home he did pass a store with a telephone booth out front and he did have some change in his pocket. That he was afraid of using the phone because the store was closed and he did not want anybody to think he was trying to rob the store. That he also wanted to get as far away from the car as he could since he had stolen it. That the thought of robbery never entered his mind when he went into the Marshburn house. At the time he grabbed the knife and stabbed the man he feared for his safety although the man had no weapon and had not threatened him with a weapon. There

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

was nothing behind the man but there was a sink behind him (the defendant). That he did not stomp the man when he was on the floor and he did not get on the floor to stab the man. That all the stabbing took place with both people standing up. That he did not get the wallet out of the man's pocket until he had fallen on the floor and after he (the defendant) had been looking for car keys. That he did not go to the house for the purpose of robbing the man that night. That he had not planned on killing Mrs. Marshburn even before she asked him not to and that the reason he stabbed Mr. Marshburn was not because Mr. Marshburn would not give him the money. That he believes his gloves got bloody from stabbing Mr. Marshburn. (R.pp. 35-47).

Father Michael Joseph Hogan, a Catholic priest from Albany, New York, testified that he was the Executive Directors of a group of rehabilitation homes in Albany and that he had known James Bush for several years when he was living in Albany. That James lived in one of the residential facilities that he supervised. That he had had occasion to counsel James Bush and had lived in the home with James Bush for several months on a daily basis. That he had an opinion as to the general character and reputation of James Bush and that it was good. That James Bush was never known as a person who was, by nature, violent. That he had not seen James Bush in one or one and a half years since he entered the Marine Corps. (R.pp. 47-48).

The trial court instructed the jury that it could find the Petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree under the theory of premeditation and deliberation, guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, guilty of murder in the second degree or guilty of manslaughter or not guilty.

The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and the defendant was sentenced to death. On January 29, 1976, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the Petitioner's conviction and sentence. 1/

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

1/ On February 12, 1976, Chief Justice Suzie Sharp stayed execution of Petitioner's death sentence in order to allow a Petition for Certiorari to be filed in this Court.

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION WAS RAISED AND DECIDED BELOW

The Petitioner raised before the North Carolina Supreme Court the question of whether or not the death penalty as applied in this case was Constitutional[2/] and the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the claim.

State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159

2/ Assignment of Error No. 1 (R. 73).

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE IMPOSITION AND CARRYING OUT OF THE SENTENCE OF DEATH FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER UNDER THE LAW OF NORTH CAROLINA VIOLATES THE EIGHTH OR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

There are now pending before the United States Supreme Court cases challenging the constitutionality of the death sentence imposed under the capital procedure mandated by State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). 3/ There is also at least one case 4/ before the United States Supreme Court by Petition for Certiorari which arises under the post-Waddell North Carolina death penalty statute which was enacted April 8, 1974, effective immediately. 5/ Because this statute does not in any way alter North Carolina's capital procedure so as to limit or control the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the State's nominally mandatory death penalty, petitioner incorporates here by reference the arguments and authorities contained at pp. 26-140, Brief for Petitioner, Fowler v. North Carolina, No. 73-7031 (attached as Appendix B, infra) concerning (1) the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty due to prosecutorial charging discretion, plea bargaining, jury discretion and executive clemency, and (2) the excessive cruelty of the death penalty.

This case shows once again that if a defendant does not have the opportunity afforded him or her to plea to a lesser degree of homicide than that defendant is prosecuted under the "mandatory" provision of the statute and that the death penalty is only "mandatory" for those who do not arouse the passion or sympathy of someone during the process which leads to trial.

****

3/ Henderson v. North Carolina, No. 73-6853 (filed June 8, 1974); Fowler v. North Carolina, No. 73-7031 (Certiorari granted October 21, 1974; citations of other cases omitted.

4/ Woodson and Waxton v. North Carolina, No. 75-_____ (filed _____), Reported in 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E. 2d 607 (1975).

5/ N.C. Sess. Laws 1973 (2nd Sess., 1974) c. 1201, §1, amending N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-17 (1974 Cum. Supp.).

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

CONCLUSION

The petitioner respectfully prays that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted, this 23 day of June, 1976.

Grady Mercer, Jr.
Post Office Box 336
Jacksonville, North Carolina 28540

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

GRADY MERCER, JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
JACKSONVILLE, N. C.
28540

ORIGINAL COPY

RECEIVED
AUG 5 1976
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

****

NO. 75-6981

****

JAMES A. BUSH,
Petitioner

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Respondent,

****

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

****

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
Attorney General of
North Carolina

LESTER V. CHALMERS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General

N. C. Department of Justice
P. O. Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
Telephone: (919) 829-2011

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

I N D E X

Page

Citation to Opinion Below.....1

Jurisdiction.....1

Question Presented.....1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.....2,3

Statement of Case.....3

Statement of Facts.....3

Argument

DOES THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE PURSUANT TO GENERAL STATUTES 14-17 ET SEQ. OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?.....3,4

Conclusion.....4

Appendix A, Opinion, State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E. 2d 333.....1a

TABLE OF CASES

State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E. 2d 333.....1,3

Woodson v. North Carolina, No. 75-5491 (July 2, 1976).....4

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257(3).....1

North Carolina General Statutes, Secs. 14-17, 15-187 and 15-188.....2,3

Constitution of the United States:

Amendment VIII.....2

Amendment XIV, Sec. 1.....2

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO. 75-6981

JAMES A. BUSH,
Petitioner

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Respondent

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

The Respondent suggests that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina seeking review of an Opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina filed January 29, 1976, be granted and limited solely to the question presented to this Court by the Petitioner.

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The Petitioner was tried, convicted and judgment of death was entered in the Superior Court of Onslow County, North Carolina. In an opinion reported in State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E. 2d 333, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the judgment of death.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

DOES THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE PURSUANT TO GENERAL STATUTES 14-17 ET SEQ. OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. This case involves the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment XIV

§1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2. This case also involves the following provisions of the General Statutes of North Carolina:

> §14-17. "Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.--A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor more than life imprisonment in the State's prison."
>
> §15-187. "Death by administration of lethal gas.--Death by electrocution under sentence of law is hereby abolished and death by the administration of lethal gas substituted therefor."
>
> §15-188. "Manner and place of execution.--The mode of executing a death sentence must in every case be by causing the convict or felon to inhale lethal gas of sufficient quantity to cause death, and the administration of such lethal gas must be continued until such convict or felon is dead;

and when any person, convict or felon shall be sentenced by any court of the State having competent jurisdiction to be so executed, such punishment shall only be inflicted within a permanent death chamber which the superintendent of the State penitentiary is hereby authorized and directed to provide within the walls of the North Carolina penitentiary at Raleigh, North Carolina. The superintendent of the State penitentiary shall also cause to be provided, in conformity with this Article and approved by the Governor and Council of State, the necessary appliances for the infliction of the punishment of death in accordance with the requirements of this Article."

STATEMENT OF CASE

This was a criminal action tried at the May 19, 1975 Session of the Superior Court of Onslow County, North Carolina. The defendant James A. Bush was charged in a bill of indictment with the capital felony of murder in the first degree. By and through his attorneys, and after arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The defendant was then sentenced to death. To the pronouncement of the judgment the defendant excepted and gave notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Petitioner now seeks review in this Court upon Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Respondent adopts as its own, as if fully set out herein, the facts as stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in its opinion in State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E. 2d 333, a copy of which is attached to Respondent's Response as Appendix A.

ARGUMENT

DOES THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE PURSUANT TO GENERAL STATUTES 14-17 ET SEQ. OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?

In accordance with the opinion of this Court entitled Woodson v. North Carolina, No. 75-5491, dated July 2, 1976 the Respondent will not argue this question. The Respondent suggests that the death penalty imposed upon the Petitioner under North Carolina's mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and therefore should be set aside. The Respondent suggests that the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina insofar as it upheld the death sentence imposed upon the Petitioner be set aside, and that this case be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, supra.

CONCLUSION

The Respondent respectfully submits, based upon the foregoing response, that Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina be allowed, and that this case be remanded to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina, No. 75-5491, filed July 2, 1976.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of August, 1976.

RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
Attorney General of
North Carolina

Lester V. Chalmers

LESTER V. CHALMERS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General

North Carolina Department of Justice
Post Office Box 629
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Telephone: (919) 829-2011

A P P E N D I X "A"

State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v

No. 93 - Onslow

JAMES A. BUSH

Appeal by defendant, James A. Bush, pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a) from Fountain, J., 19 May 1975 Session Onslow Superior Court.

Defendant was tried upon a bill of indictment which charged that "James A. Bush late of the County of Onslow on the 18th day of November 1974, with force and arms, at and in the said County, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder Kirby W. Marshburn . . . ."

The State's evidence tended to show the following:

Eva A. Marshburn, wife of the deceased, testified that on 18 November 1974, after completing her work in Jacksonville, North Carolina, at about 9:10 p.m. she drove to her house trailer located near Highway 258 about eleven miles from Jacksonville. Upon entering the hall of her trailer she observed that two bedrooms had been ransacked. The contents of dresser drawers in each bedroom had been emptied on the bed and personal items were scattered about the rooms. She had left the rooms in an orderly condition except for one unmade bed. Mrs. Marshburn proceeded to the living room and there she observed her husband in the kitchen lying facedown in a pool of blood. A blood-stained knife with a bent blade lay on the floor near her husband's body. She recognized the knife as being one of her set of steak knives. Her husband's wallet was also lying between his body and a kitchen cabinet. Upon turning to reach for the telephone, she saw defendant who said, "You're next." Defendant told her that he would have to kill her because she had seen his face and he knew that she would turn him in. He then demanded money and upon his agreement to leave, she emptied her pocketbook which contained something over three dollars and gave it to him. Defendant then cut the telephone line and tied the witness to a chair with some drapery cord taken from the curtains. Mrs. Marshburn asked defendant why he killed her husband and he replied, "He wouldn't do anything I asked him to do, so I had to

FILED

JAN 29 1976

IN THE OFFICE OF
CLERK SUPREME COURT
OF NORTH CAROLINA

kill him." After telling the witness that he was going to take her car, defendant left the trailer but returned in a few minutes and inquired about a gun and some ammunition. The witness directed him to the gun and defendant then left in the Marshburn car. Mrs. Marshburn was able to free herself and find help.

Robert E. Lee of the Onslow Sheriff's Department testified that he went to the Marshburn home on the night of 18 November 1974 where he observed the body of Mr. Marshburn lying on the kitchen floor in a pool of blood. He found a knife and a wallet near the body. The officer described the premises as having been "ramshackled."

Gwendolyn Cruz testified that she drove her 1974 Grand Prix automobile to work at the Area I Club on the afternoon of 18 November. She placed her keys on the bar behind which she worked. The witness observed defendant at the bar at about 4:30 p.m. and saw him leave at about 6:00 p.m. She later discovered that her automobile keys were missing and that her automobile had been stolen.

Johnnie Durrie testified that on the night of 18 November 1974, at about 8:15 p.m., he saw defendant standing beside a Grand Prix automobile which was in a ditch on the side of Highway 258, approximately one mile from Kirby Marshburn's house. He offered to give defendant some assistance but defendant told him that he didn't want a wrecker and that he would get the car out later. Durrie stated that while he was there another man stopped and offered defendant a ride to Highway 17 but defendant declined this offer. There was another dwelling immediately across the road. It was later ascertained by police officers that the Grand Prix automobile belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Thurman Cruz.

Michael Papenfuse testified that on 18 November 1974, between 9:40 and 9:45 p.m., he saw defendant go into the Bang Bang Club. A short time thereafter he observed defendant leave in an automobile which he thought was a Ford.

Deputy Sheriff J. L. Jones of the Onslow Sheriff's Department, at about 11:30 on the same night, found a 1970 Ford, later identified as the Marshburn's car, approximately a quarter mile from the main gate of Camp Lejeune.

On the night of 10 November 1974 Officer Jarman of the Onslow Sheriff's Department located defendant at Camp Lejeune. He advised defendant of his constitutional rights and questioned him concerning the events of the previous night. Defendant stated that he had taken the Cruz automobile and driven it into a ditch and he thereafter walked to the Marshburn trailer home where Mr. Marshburn allowed him to use the telephone and also gave him a glass of water. Defendant said that while they were in the kitchen, Mr. Marshburn, for no apparent reason, pushed him into the kitchen counter and that he grabbed a knife from a counter and stabbed Mr. Marshburn several times. Mr. Marshburn fell to the floor and defendant was attempting to drive away in the Marshburn truck when Mrs. Marshburn arrived. He followed Mrs. Marshburn into the trailer, took some money from her and tied her into a chair. He left in Mrs. Marshburn's automobile. Defendant signed a statement after it was reduced to writing.

The State offered into evidence several articles of defendant's blood-stained clothing. The blood stains were found to be of the same type as that of deceased. Defendant's boots were introduced into evidence and the tread on the boots was similar to the bloody boot prints found on the floor of the Marshburn trailer.

Dr. Walter Gable, an expert in pathology, testified that he examined Mr. Marshburn's body on the morning of 10 November 1974. His examination revealed lacerations on the neck and face and four stab wounds in the front of the victim's body. He testified that in his opinion Mr. Marshburn died as a result of a stab wound which penetrated the sternum and terminated in the victim's heart. He further stated that the steak knife found near Mr. Marshburn's body could have been the instrument which inflicted the fatal wound.

Defendant testifying in his own behalf stated that he went to the Area I Service Club at about 4:30 p.m. on 10 November where he drank beer until 7:15 p.m. He then took the Cruz automobile and was driving toward Richlands on Highway 258 when he lost control of the car and drove it into a ditch. He later walked to the Marshburn trailer home where he

asked Mr. Marshburn if he could use the telephone. He had some conversation with Mr. Marshburn during which Mr. Marshburn said "something about a colored boy down the road owned a wrecker." Defendant then asked Mr. Marshburn what color the boy was. At this point he said that Mr. Marshburn pushed him toward the kitchen counter and told him to leave. He picked up a knife from the counter and stabbed Mr. Marshburn a number of times. Defendant said he had no intention of stealing anything at the time he stabbed Mr. Marshburn and that he immediately tried to leave the premises in the Marshburn truck. There were no keys in the truck and he returned to the trailer and ransacked the bedrooms in an unsuccessful search for the keys. He then searched the body and found the keys in Mr. Marshburn's pants pocket. As he prepared to leave in the truck, Mrs. Marshburn arrived and he followed her into the house, took money from her, cut the telephone line, and tied Mrs. Marshburn into a chair. He also took a rifle and some ammunition before driving away in the Marshburn automobile. On cross-examination defendant testified that two people did offer him assistance at the place where he had driven the Cruz automobile into a ditch. He also admitted that he passed a pay telephone booth on the way to the Marshburn trailer and he had some change in his pocket at that time. He explained that he did not use the telephone because it was too near the stolen automobile and he was afraid that he would be accused of burglary because of its proximity to a store. He further said that he thought there was another dwelling between the Marshburn residence and the stolen automobile.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree Defendant appealed from a judgment imposing the death sentence.

Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General Lester V. Chalmers, Jr. and Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray, for the State.

William J. Morgan and Grady Mercer, Jr. for the defendant.

BRANCH, Justice.

Defendant's first assignment of error is as follows:

I. WAS THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF DEATH UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED THE DEFENDANT UNDER THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES?

The questions presented by this assignment of error were considered and answered by this Court in the case of State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607. There Chief Justice Sharp, in part, wrote:

> G.S. 14-17, as rewritten on 8 April 1974 by the enactment of N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1201, § 1 provides that murder in the first degree" shall be punished with death." Defendants contend, however, that capital punishment "under the laws of North Carolina [would] violate U. S. Const. amend. VIII and amend. XIV, § 1, and N. C. Const. art. 1, §§ 19, 27." In the last three years this Court has several times rejected these contentions. They have been thoroughly considered and further discussion would be merely repetitious. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E. 2d 19 (1973); State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E. 2d 721 (1974); State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E. 2d 803 (1974); State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42, 203 S.E. 2d 38 (1974); State v. Avery, 286 N.C. 459, 212 S.E. 2d 142 (1975).

Defendant's specific argument that he was denied due process because the District Attorney had the absolute discretion to charge and prosecute for a capital offense or to bring an accused to trial upon a lesser included offense has also been considered and rejected by this Court in a number of cases. See State v. Young, 287 N.C. 377, 214 S.E.2d 763; State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 213 S.E.2d 214; State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721.

Defendant next contends that the trial judge erred by allowing the witness, Eva A. Marshburn, to respond to a question of the District Attorney about a matter which was not within her knowledge.

The District Attorney asked Mrs. Marshburn if her husband usually carried money in his pocket and she replied, "Usually not a whole lot, but just a little." Defendant takes the position that this evidence prejudiced defendant "by allowing speculation of a robbery to creep into evidence."

A murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery is murder in the first degree. G.S. 14-17; State v. Bailey, 284 N.C. 360, 110 S.E.2d 165; State v. Diggs, 224 N.C. 732, 32 S.E.2d 352.

We must concede that the evidence was of little relevance since it is not necessary for property to be actually taken in order to support a conviction of murder in the first degree when the homicide occurs during an attempted robbery. However, in light of the evidence admitted without objection to the effect that the witness found her husband's body lying in a pool of blood beside a knife and his wallet and that the dwelling had been "ransacked" we can find little prejudice in the admission of this evidence. The evidence admitted without objection was sufficient to support an inference that a robbery had been committed. This assignment of error is overruled.

Defendant assigns as error Judge Fountain's ruling sustaining the State's objection to Deputy Woodward's testimony which would have shown that the officer's investigation tended to corroborate portions of defendant's statement to the officer.

The State takes the position that the proffered evidence was conclusory in nature and invaded the province of the jury.

Officer Woodward testified as to a statement made to him by defendant. The officer's testimony, in essence, corroborated the testimony later given by defendant. On cross-examination, Officer Woodward, in part, stated:

> The defendant proved to be very cooperative . . . . At the barracks he showed us where he had placed the car keys and he also voluntarily showed us where he had put the clothes that he had worn. He gave us permission to go in his locker and cooperated totally with us after his initial denial.
>
> We checked out his remarks concerning going to a bar and that resulted in Mr. Papenfuse being located. The little details about getting cigarettes checked out to be truthful.

This assignment of error is based upon the following question and ruling:

> Q. Mr. Woodward, so far as you have been able to personally check in attempt to verify things that were told you by the defendant, have you found these things to be accurate and truthful insofar as you have been able to ascertain?
> MR. ALEXANDER: Objection.
> COURT: Sustained.

Had the officer been permitted to answer he would have stated:

> A. Yes, sir, everything that he has told me that took place we have confirmed except the car keys to Mrs. Marshburn's vehicle. We were unable to find those.
> . . .

Our research reveals some cases which tend to support the State's position.

In State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322, the defendants were charged with a criminal conspiracy to commit robbery and with aiding and abetting in robbery. Three of the defendants entered pleas of guilty to the conspiracy charge and another defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of aiding and abetting. Two of the defendants, Stroud and Summerlin, entered pleas of not guilty to both charges. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as charged as to Stroud and Summerlin. Defendant Summerlin appealed. One of the co-conspirators testified for the State. A police officer, without objection, also gave inculpatory testimony against Summerlin. Summerlin admitted that he received some of the stolen property and tried to dispose of it. Thereafter the Sheriff of Wayne County testified concerning the arrest of the defendant Chappell. He stated that Chappel then told him about his part in the robbery. The Solicitor then inquired, "What did he tell you?" The Sheriff, over objection, replied, "Just what you have just heard, practically verbatim." In deciding this assignment of error, the Court stated:

> The defendant contends the answer was a conclusion on the part of the witness, and violated the general hearsay rule, and invaded the province of the jury, citing S. v. McLaughlin, 126 N.C. 1060, 35 S.E. 1037, and Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, Sec. 126.
>
> If the solicitor had pursued his inquiry no further as to what Chappell told him, this exception would be well taken. However, the answer of the witness was not accepted and he was requested by the solicitor to repeat as nearly as he could the conversation between him and Chappell. The Sheriff then testified in detail, without objection, as to what Chappell had told him. The exception will not be upheld.

The defendant was convicted of rape in the case of State v. McLaughlin, 126 N.C. 1060, 35 S.E. 1037. There defense counsel examined the committing Justice of Peace who recited the evidence given by prosecutrix at the preliminary hearing. On cross-examination, the solicitor asked the witness, "if the testimony of Harriet McMillan, the

prosecutrix in this case was substantially the same as it was on the hearing before him in the justice's court." Over objection the witness said "she testified to about the same on both trials." Holding the admission of this evidence to be error, this Court stated:

> . . . The general rule of law is that the jury (or the judge, as the case may be) are the triers of matters of dispute, and form their conclusions from the facts before them, and not upon the opinions of others on the subject. So that the facts and not opinions are to be listened to by the jury.
>
> * * *
>
> Whether the two statements by the prosecutrix were substantially the same, is a fact to be determined by the jury, and not the witness. That would in effect make the witness the jury as to that fact. It was competent for the witness to state what the prosecutrix said on the former trial, and the jury would then determine whether the two statements were the same or not.

The rule that opinion evidence is not admissible because it invades the province of the jury has been criticized in several treatises on evidence because: (1) The reasons justifying its use are unconvincing, (2) its meaning is obscure, and (3) the many exceptions to the rule severely restrict its application. Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence (Brandis Rev.) § 126. See also Professor Morgan's review of King & Pillinger, Opinion Evidence in Illinois, in 29 Va.L.Rev. 970 (1943). Some of the exceptions to the rule are considered in 1 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence (Brandis Rev.) § 125:

> Opinion evidence is always admissible when the facts on which the opinion or conclusion is based cannot be so described that the jury will understand them sufficiently to be able to draw their own inferences. Even when it might be possible to describe the facts in detail, it may still be impracticable to do so because of the limitations of customary speech, or the relative unimportance of the subject testified about, or the difficulty of analyzing the thought processes by which the witness reaches his conclusion, or because the inference drawn is such a natural and well understood one that it would be a waste of time for him to elaborate the facts, or perhaps for some other reason.
>
> It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down a hard and fast rule to cover the infinite variety of situations that may arise, but the admissibility of opinion evidence under the circumstances suggested above is thoroughly established. The idea is variously expressed by saying that "instantaneous conclusions of the mind, or "natural and instinctive inferences," or the "evidence of common observers testifying to the results of their observation" are admissible, or by

characterizing the witness's statement as a "shorthand statement of the fact" or as "the statement of a physical fact rather than the expression of a theoretical opinion." [Emphasis ours.]

It would have been a waste of time for the officer to testify as to how each fact in defendant's statement was confirmed by his independent investigation. The answer would have only summarized the results of the witness's observation of physical facts. In our opinion the challenged answer was a shorthand statement of fact and should not have been rejected on the ground that it invaded the province of the jury.

Defendant concedes in his brief that the purpose of the proffered evidence was to bolster defendant's credibility by showing this specific instance of truthfulness. Thus the trial judge's ruling might well have been based on defendant's failure to properly present this character evidence.

In North Carolina the rule is that when a character witness is called he must first state that he knows the general reputation of the party about whom he proposes to testify. If he does not know the general reputation of the person in question, the witness may not properly testify as to the reputation and character of that person. If he states that he is familiar with the party's general reputation he may state whether it is good or bad and then on his own volition he may state whether it is good for certain virtues or bad for certain vices. State v. Hicks, 200 N.C. 539, 157 S.E. 851; State v. Nance, 195 N.C. 47, 141 S.E. 468 (dictum). It is improper, however, to allow a witness to testify about specific acts without first establishing that the witness knows the party's general reputation. State v. Ellis, 243 N.C. 142, 90 S.E.2d 225; State v. Coley, 114 N.C. 879, 19 S.E. 705.

Here defendant did not show that the witness knew defendant's general reputation but merely sought to prove his own character by attempting to show a single specific act of truthfulness. Even had the trial judge ruled incorrectly, no substantial prejudice to defendant arose from the rejection of this evidence since the witness had already testified to facts which tended to support the conclusion defendant sought to elicit.

In fact, all of the State's evidence tended to show that the portions of defendant's statement which were subject to confirmation by independent investigation were true.

For the reasons stated, this assignment of error is overruled.

By his assignments of error 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9, defendant presents the question of whether the trial judge erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment as of nonsuit on the charge of first-degree murder.

Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree by a bill of indictment drawn under the provisions of G. S. 15-144. Such indictment will support a verdict of murder in the first degree if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused killed with malice and after premeditation and deliberation or in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of of any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony the commission of which creates any substantial foreseeable human risk and actually results in loss of life. G.S. 14-17; State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666; State v. Haynes, 276 N.C. 150, 171 S.E.2d 435.

We first consider whether the State presented such substantial evidence as would permit the jury to find that defendant unlawfully, with malice and after premeditation and deliberation killed deceased.

The intentional use of a deadly weapon proximately causing death gives rise to presumptions that (1) the killing was unlawful, and (2) the killing was done with malice. This is second-degree murder. State v. Hankerson, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___; State v. Williams, ___ N.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___; State v. Dubois, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E.2d 393; State v. Gordon, 241 N.C. 356, 85 S.E.2d 322. Here all the evidence shows that defendant killed deceased by the intentional use of a deadly weapon and the only question before us at this point is whether the killing was done after premeditation and deliberation.

Premeditation means thought beforehand for some length of time.

Deliberation means that the action was done in a cool state of blood. Deliberation does not require reflection or brooding for an apparent length of time, but rather an intention to kill executed by

defendant in furtherance of a fixed design to gratify a feeling of revenge or to accomplish some unlawful purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by just cause or legal provocation. State v. Fountain, 282 N.C. 58, 191 S.E.2d 674; State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 178 S.E.2d 65, cert. denied 404 U.S. 940, 30 L.Ed.2d 74, 92 S.Ct. 133; State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 111 S.E. 869.

Premeditation and deliberation must usually be inferred from various circumstances. Among those circumstances are: (1) want of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) the conduct of an accused before and after the killing and (3) that the killing was done in a vicious and brutal manner. State v. Fountain, supra; State v. Dubose, supra; State v. Reams, supra; State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769.

Upon motion for judgment as of nonsuit in a criminal prosecution, the questions before the Court are whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged, and whether the accused was the perpetrator of the charged offense. In determining these questions the evidence before the Court must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference which may be drawn from the evidence. Any contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State for the purpose of the motion. Incompetent evidence admitted is considered as if it were competent. State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755, cert. denied 414 U.S. 874, 38 L.Ed.2d 114, 94 S.Ct. 157; State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 158 S.E.2d 617; State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679; State v. Faust, supra.

The evidence in this case, when considered according to the well-established rules above set forth, discloses that on the night of 18 November 1974 defendant, a twenty-year-old Marine, stole an automobile and thereafter drove it into a ditch in the vicinity of the trailer home occupied by deceased and his wife. Defendant then went to the home then occupied by sixty-five-year-old Kirby W. Marshburn who allowed defendant to use his telephone and later gave defendant a glass of water. Thereafter because deceased "wouldn't do what he was told to do" defendant attacked

him with a knife inflicting lacerations in the eye, two separate open wounds in the neck, four stab wounds in the front of the body and the fatal stab which passed through the sternum and pierced deceased's heart. Defendant then searched the body of Mr. Marshburn, removed his wallet and the keys for the Marshburn truck, ransacked the dwelling and left deceased lying in a pool of his own blood. As defendant prepared to leave in the Marshburn truck, he observed Mrs. Marshburn as she entered the dwelling. He returned, robbed her, took the keys to the automobile, took a gun and some ammunition, tied Mrs. Marshburn up and departed in the Marshburn automobile.

The actions of defendant in obtaining entrance into the Marshburn home in the nighttime and there savagely and brutally attacking his benefactor with a knife with little or no provocation were circumstances which permitted an inference of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant' conduct after the killing in robbing deceased's body, ransacking the dwelling and leaving the body of deceased lying in his own blood and thereafter returning to rob and tie up the wife of the deceased are also circumstances which permit the inference that the killing was done with premeditation and deliberation.

We hold that there was sufficient substantial evidence to permit, but not require, the jury to find that after premeditation and deliberation defendant formed a fixed purpose to kill and did kill Kirby W. Marshburn.

Defendant also contends that the trial judge erred by submitting the charge of murder in the first degree on the "felony-murder" theory.

G.S. 14-17, in part, provides:

> A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree . . . .

The case of State v. Thompson, supra, clearly states principles pertinent to decision of the question before us. There Chief Justice Bobbitt, speaking for the Court, stated:

> . . . A murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony within the purview of G.S. 14-17 is murder in the first degree, irrespective of premeditation or deliberation or malice aforethought. State v. Maynard, 247 N.C. 462, 469, 101 S.E. 2d 340, 345 (1958), and cases cited.
>
> * * *
>
> . . . An interrelationship between the felony and the homicide is prerequisite to the application of the felony-murder doctrine. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 21(b), at 870; Perkins, op. cit. at 35. A killing is committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony within the purview of a felony-murder statute "when there is no break in the chain of events leading from the initial felony to the act causing death, so that the homicide is linked to or part of the series of incidents, forming one continuous transaction." . . .

Defendant contends that he did not intend to rob until after he had killed Mr. Marshburn and that he went to the Marshburn trailer home in order to use a telephone. However, the evidence pertinent to this contention, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, shows that on the night of 18 November 1974 defendant drove a stolen automobile into a ditch in the vicinity of the trailer home of deceased. There was a dwelling across the road from the place where defendant had driven the stolen automobile into a ditch. Two persons offered to obtain help for defendant but he refused their offer. Defendant did not attempt to find a telephone at the nearby dwelling. Neither did he attempt to use an available outside pay telephone located at a service station which he passed on the way to the Marshburn dwelling. Defendant had change in his pocket. Upon arrival at the Marshburn dwelling, Mr. Marshburn permitted defendant to use the telephone and gave him a drink of water. Thereafter defendant killed the deceased as hereinabove recounted because "he wouldn't do what he was told to do." He then robbed Mr. Marshburn's body, ransacked the house, took the keys to the Marshburn truck from deceased's body and prepared to leave in the Marshburn truck. At this point, Mrs. Marshburn returned and found her husband's body lying in the pool of blood. His pocketbook was lying nearby. Defendant then returned to the Marshburn home, robbed Mrs. Marshburn of her money, took other property including the keys to the Marshburn automobile and then departed in the Marshburn automobile.

All of defendant's actions during the late afternoon and night of 10 November 1974 apparently were guided and controlled by an intent to steal and rob.

In our opinion, this evidence was sufficient to permit, but not require, a jury to find that defendant killed Kirby W. Harshburn while in the perpetration of a robbery.

The trial judge correctly overruled defendant's motions for judgment as of nonsuit.

Finally defendant argues that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by expressing an opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 which was not supported by the evidence.

In the questioned portion of the charge Judge Fountain stated that defendant contended that "he did not commit murder in the first degree, or any other unlawful homicide" and ". . . defendant contends from the evidence that you should acquit him of that [manslaughter] on the grounds of self-defense."

Defense counsel did not bring the alleged misstatement to the trial judge's attention. The trial judge's statement of defendant's contentions seems to be logically consistent with defendant's own testimony. On direct examination, defendant testified:

> . . . I stabbed him to get him away from me. I had backed up as far as I could back up and the only way I knew out of the trailer was through the door that I entered. I was afraid for my safety at that time and I now realize that I probably used more force than was necessary. . . .
>
> * * *
>
> . . . At that time I thought I had a reason for picking up the knife as I was looking out for myself and my safety. . . . I did think it was necessary to pick up a knife and stab him at that time.

Usually the contentions of the parties are apparent from the evidence presented at trial. When the contentions are not so apparent or counsel's contentions differ from the evidence he produced at trial, this Court does not require the trial judge to be clairvoyant. For this reason we have consistently held that any misstatements of counsel's contentions must be brought to the trial judge's attention before the jury retires fo

deliberation so that he has an opportunity for correction. State v. Gaines, 283 N.C. 33, 194 S.E.2d 839; State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28; State v. Gaines, supra; State v. Butler, 269 N.C. 733, 153 S.E.2d 477; State v. Shumaker, 251 N.C. 670, 111 S.E.2d 670; State v. Saunders, 245 N.C. 333, 95 S.E.2d 876. Defendant seeks to avoid application of this rule by urging that the alleged misstatement of defendant's contentions constituted an expression of opinion.

A similar assignment of error was considered by this Court in the recent case of State v. Griffin, 286 N.C. 437, 219 S.E.2d 48 (1975). In Griffin, the defendant, relying on an insanity defense, contended that he had admitted a shooting and it was consequently improper for the trial judge to state that defendant contended that he was not guilty of first-degree murder or any lesser included offense. We there held that the trial judge's statement of defense counsel's contentions were not improper since a plea of not guilty places the burden on the State of proving all elements of the crime charged in the indictment, including the elements of lesser included offenses. See also State v. Lewis, 274 N.C. 438, 164 S.E.2d 177, and State v. Cooper, 256 N.C. 372, 124 S.E.2d 91. The trial judge's statement of contention was not an expression of opinion. Further, the challenged statement appears to be favorable to defendant since it presented to the jury a possible complete defense.

Our careful examination of this record reveals that defendant was given a fair trial free from prejudicial error.

No error.

Chief Justice Sharp concurs in the result.